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I. INTRODUCTION

Everyone dies; it is a fact of life. This means that the American
funeral industry will reach everyone. How state boards regulate the industry affect the relationship we, as future consumers, will have with
the industry. In 2015, the United States Supreme Court held that state
boards and the regulations they implement are not always immune
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from antitrust review.' This decision necessarily calls for a reevaluation of the actions taken by state funeral boards, particularly because
of how heavily-regulated the funeral industry is. Many consumers and
commentators feel that the funeral industry takes advantage of consumers in their most vulnerable state, 2 and that regulations play a big
role in that. 3 As will be discussed below, state funeral boards implemented many of these regulations for the stated purpose of protecting
consumers. Yet these regulations have served the industry, making it
more expensive and less competitive. Whereas American consumers
once demanded more stringent regulations on the funeral industry, the
industry itself is now the one championing those same regulations to
keep competition out and keep funeral prices high. With the annual
revenue of the funeral industry reaching sixteen billion dollars in
2013,4 consumer interest in righting the wrongs of anti-competitive
regulations in an industry of which we all will be consumers must become paramount.
One of the most consequential aspects of the Supreme Court's
holding in North CarolinaState BoardofDental Examiners affecting
funeral boards pertains to states' occupational licensing schemes. The
decision came in the midst of what has been an over-proliferation of
licensing regulations in many industries. As of 2015, about thirty percent of Americans needed a license-which may include a degree or
passing a test-to enter an industry workforce, when less than five percent of the workforce needed a license during the 1950s. 5 Licensing

regulations are not necessarily a thorn in the side of economic liberty,
and they can often serve compelling interests in consumer welfare and

1N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1104 (2015).
2 For a lighter take on the funeral industry's practices, see truTV,
Adam Ruins Everything-How Funerals Completely Rip Us Off, YouTUBE (Dec. 21, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OGqbALhpUmM.
3 See infra Section IV.A.
4 Revenue offuneral homes (NAICS 81221) in the United States from 2008
to 2013 (in billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA (2017), http://www.statista.com/statistics/296203/revenue-funeral-homes-in-the-us/.
5 Edward Timmins & Anna Mills, Short-SightedPolicy: Studying opticians
shows occupational licensing doesn't help consumers, USNEWS (Feb. 17, 2015),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/02/17/occupationallicensing-is-short-sighted-hurts-low-income-workers (the authors' definition of occupational licensing laws includes requirements such as passing a specific test or
obtaining a degree); Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of OccupationalLicensing, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. RELS. 676, 678 (2010); see e.g.,
InstituteForJustice, Why Can't Chuck Get His Business Off the Ground, YouTUBE
(Oct. 26, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQscE3Xed64.
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public health and safety. However, consumers must be cautious because licensing regulations do not translate per se to better quality
goods or services for consumers. In the funeral industry specifically,
there is scant evidence suggesting a correlation between the two. 6 Consumers must be wary that regulatory boards and legislatures often
abuse licensing regulations to protect market power rather than consumers. Such regulations are often used to bar entry into the market,
keep consumer prices high, and prevent economically healthy competition between those already within the market. This problem has garnered the attention of many in recent years. The White House even
issued a report that laid a framework for state regulatory boards to use
in implementing occupational licenses. 7
Occupational licensing is just one of many regulations negatively affecting consumers' relationship with the funeral industry. This
Note advocates for reevaluation and deregulation of state funeral director licensing schemes and their requirements. These requirements
have played a role in the significant increase in prices for goods and
services in this sector-the traditional burial ranging from seven to fifteen thousand dollars.8 Specifically, this Note will address two aspects
of funeral home occupational licensing: (1) the regulatory schemes that
require an individual be both a funeral director and embalmer; and (2)
the educational requirements that an individual must have to be a funeral director. Part II of this Note will include a brief history of licensing regulations in the American funeral industry, the justifications for
the licensing regulations, the social reforms that led to the Federal
Trade Commission's ("FTC") Funeral Rule, and state regulations that
are restricting competition. Part III will explain occupational licensing,
when regulatory boards are justified in implementing them, and the
recent White House report that lays a framework for policymakers.
6 Lana Harfoush, Grave Consequencesfor Economic Liberty: The Funeral

Industry's ProtectionistOccupationalLicensing Scheme, the CircuitSplit, and Why
it Matters, 5 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 135, 149 (2011).
7 Occupational Licensing: A Framework for Policymakers, DEP'T OF
TREASURY OFF. OF ECON. POL'Y, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, AND DEP'T OF LAB.

(July
2015)
[hereinafter
White
House
Licensing
Report],
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final nonembargo.pdf.
8Funeral Costs: How Much Does an Average Funeral Cost?, PARTING:
BLOG (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.parting.com/blog/funeral-costs-how-much-doesan-average-funeral-cost/ (estimating the range as between $7,000-$10,000, with an
average of $9,000); JAMES D. GWARTNEY ET AL., MICROECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND

PUBLIC CHOICE 224 (12th ed. 2008) (estimating the average as between $10,000$15,000)
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Part IV will argue that some of the funeral industry's occupational licensing requirements are no longer justifiable, and will provide possible alternatives to existing licensing requirements. Part V will briefly
explain how consumers can advocate for changes in their states, both
by advocating to the boards themselves and by challenging the regulations through the court system. Part VI will offer concluding remarks
to the Note.
II.

HISTORY, OVERVIEW, AND THE RISE OF REGULATION

A.

The Early History ofFuneralRegulations

The funeral industry has been an established part of American
culture since the late nineteenth-century. The industrial revolution,
mass consumerism, and the increasing reliance on science and technology over religious faith were all a part of establishing the funeral
home as an American institution. The social developments of the time,
such as the medicalization of death,1 0 as well as certain institutional
shifts such as changing considerations of practical home design," also
contributed to the funeral home replacing the family home as the place
to lay a loved one to rest.
The most crucial factor in establishing the funeral home as an
American institution, which also gave rise to the industry's first occupational licenses, was the modernization and growing acceptance of
embalming techniques. Embalming first became a part of the country's
consciousness during the Civil War when Abraham Lincoln instituted
what were called "embalmer-surgeons," who embalmed Union soldiers so they could be returned to their families. 12 Given the nature of
9

GARY LADERMAN, REST IN PEACE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF DEATH AND
THE FUNERAL HOME IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 47 (2005).

10 d. at 3 (explaining that the 3,800% increase in hospitals between 18731923 led to a new perspective on death, which was that death is the defeat of medical
technologies).
'' Id. at 5-6 (considerations of domestic space led middle and upper class
families, especially in urban environments, to design their homes without a parlor,
where home funerals historically took place).
12 David Foos, State Ready-to-Embalm Laws and the Modern FuneralMarket: The Needfor Change and SuggestedAlternatives,2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1375,
1384 (2012). However, it was Abraham Lincoln's funeral that really brought America's attention to the embalming procedure, which was the critical turning point that
propelled the funeral industry into the twentieth-century. See Gary Laderman, FuneralIndustry,ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEATH AND DYING [hereinafter FuneralIndustry],
http://www.deathreference.com/En-Gh/Funeral-Industry.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2011) ("Hundreds of thousands of people filed past the viewable body on display in
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the "profession" at the time, however, those in the industry sought to
implement occupational licenses 1 3 so as to appear more prestigious and
to protect their livelihoods from rivals.' 4 Virginia was the first state to
enact legislation in 1884, with twenty-four states following its lead by
1900.15 These occupational licenses gave funeral homes a sense of professionalism and established them as the "primary mediators between
the living and the dead from the moment of death to the final disposition."l6

While some of the motivation for these early licenses was to
create a learned funeral "profession," health and safety concerns surrounding the embalming procedure also drove the need for industry
regulation. These health and safety concerns became a large justification for the licenses at the turn of the last century. 7 First, embalming
techniques were crude at the time, 8 often involving homemade embalming fluid with arsenic as the principal chemical, and threatened

cities from Washington, D.C., to Springfield, Illinois, and newspaper reports provided the public with graphic details about embalmers, whose methods were central
to preserving a sacred relic that ritualistically united Americans after the divisive and
bloody war."); Foos, supra note 12, at 1385 (estimating that 1.3 million Americans
viewed the open casket on the twenty-day caravan from D.C. to Springfield);
LADERMAN, supra note 9, at 6 (stating that it was Abraham Lincoln's funeral that
changed the general perception of embalming from fear of bodily mutilation and
grisly surgery to a legitimate procedure).
13 "Occupational licensing is defined as a process where entry into an occupation requires the permission of the government, and the state requires some demonstration of a minimum degree of competency." Morris Kleiner, OccupationalLicensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 189, 191 (2000).
14 Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and OccupationalLicensing 1890-1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 CAL. L. REV. 487, 501 (1965); The
principle "rivals" to those wishing to implement these regulations were doctors and
clergymen. Id.
15 ROBERT W. HABENSTEIN & WILLIAM M. LAMERS, THE HISTORY OF

AMERICAN FUNERAL DIRECTING 457-501 (1955).

LADERMAN, supra note 9, at 8 ("[E]mbalming became the enduring signature of the nascent funeral industry, a practice at the center of the economic, cultural, and religious funereal universe taking shape."); see Foos, supra note 12 (explaining that although embalming as a practice began as separate from the funeral
service industry, the two began integrating between the Civil War and the turn of the
century).
17 David E. Harrington & Kathy J. Krynski, The Effect of State FuneralRegulations on Cremation Rates: Testingfor Demand Inducement in FuneralMarkets,
45 J. LAW & ECON. 199, 203 (2002).
Foos, supra note 12, at 1386-87; ROBERT G. MAYER, EMBALMING:
HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 476 (4th ed. 2006) (techniques ranged from primitive cavity treatment to a more sophisticated arterial embalming).
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the safety of those embalming. 1 9 The second safety concern was the
belief that cemeteries with un-embalmed bodies posed a health risk to
nearby towns and water sources.2 0 Both the safety of inexperienced
embalmers and the belief that un-embalmed bodies were infectious
served as historical justifications for early funeral regulations.
By the mid-twentieth-century, the traditional burial 21 had become the standard practice for grieving families. Most, if not all, of the
funeral process took place at and was handled by all-3urpose funeral
homes, which were becoming increasingly prevalent. 2 This cultural
shift in the handling of death was not without its detractors though.23
However, a more startling problem that came to light in the mid-twentieth-century dealt with how the consumer's wallet was being affected
by the shift, rather than their sensitivity to change.
The public was skeptical of the American funeral throughout
the first half of the twentieth-century as many grew to see it as a
scam. 2 4 Much of the early criticism focused on the capitalistic, competitive environment of the undertaking business.25 The anti-funeral

19 MAYER, supra note 18.
20 Harrington & Krynski, supra note 17, at 207 (proponents of regulating
embalmers in the late nineteenth-century believed that dead bodies were infectious
and could be disinfected through embalming).
21 "Traditional burials" are memorial services centered on the public display
of an embalmed loved one at a funeral home. See Traditional Burial,
CEMETERYDEPOT,
http://www.cemeterydepot.com/Traditional-Burial-information.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
22 Funeral directors would handle the multitude of detailed tasks that would
have proven distressful for the family. LADERMAN, supra note 9, at 23.
23 Some felt that with the advent of embalming, funerals became a form of
"pagan body worship" and that it encouraged the denial of death. Id. at 22. Funeral
directors often countered with a psychological argument that the embalmed body
created a therapeutic "memory picture" that would afford loved ones closure in the
grieving process. Id.
24 FuneralIndustry, supra note 12. Consumers began to see the cost of funerals as outrageous and felt that funeral homes were taking advantage of many lowincome families at their most vulnerable time. Id. Also, many funeral directors participated in deceptive practices, such as adding non-itemized costs to the contract,
enraged consumers, community leaders, academics, and politicians alike. Id. Public
hearings were even held during this time to address these concerns. Id.
25 QUINCY L DOWD,

FUNERAL MANAGEMENT AND COSTS: A WORLD-

SURVEY OF BURIAL AND CREMATION (1921) (criticizing the wasteful nature of funeral costs associated with flowers, vaults, cemetery plots, and even the church, and
called the public to consider more simplistic alternatives such as cremation); JOHN
C. GEBHART, FUNERAL COSTS: WHAT THEY AVERAGE: ARE THEY Too HIGH? CAN
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home rhetoric called for reform, increased regulation, and oversight,
which reached the public in books, newspapers, magazines, and academic journals.26 Despite this early concern, it was not until the early
1960s, by which time death care had become a billion-dollar industry,2 7 that the call for reform would get its final push thanks to Jessica
Mitford's scathing expos6.
Jessica Mitford first became interested in the unscrupulous
practices of the funeral industry when her husband, a labor lawyer, noticed that when a union worker died, the death benefit would end up in
the hands of the funeral director, and not the surviving spouse and children. 2 8 After publishing a successful article in Frontieron the subject
of funeral trade magazines, a writer for the Saturday Evening Post
talked Mitford into writing a book on the subject matter.29 In 1963,
Mitford published The American Way of Death. Through a comical
and sensationalist lens, The American Way of Death challenged the
mythology of death perpetuated by funeral directors. What really bothered Mitford were not the unethical members of the funeral industry,
but rather the ethical ones. 30 In the wake of Mitford's book, the funeral
industry was left fighting the public realization that the image of funeral directors as exploiters of grief was more than just a stereotype.

THEY BE REDUCED 221 (1928) (characterizing competition within the funeral industry as a competition for "the possession of bodies," and that once the funeral director
obtains possession of a body, she can "charge all that the traffic will bear").
26
LADERMAN, supra note 9, at 59.
27

Id. at 45.

28 JESSICA MITFORD, THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEATH REVISITED, at xiii

(1998).

29

Id. at xiv-xv.

3o LADERMAN, supra note 9, at 85 ("[S]he is really writing about a pervasive, industry-wide ethic she found to be depraved, duplicitous, and deceiving.").
Mitford argued that the funeral industry invented the "need for grief therapy," and
the supposed therapeutic value of viewing an embalmed body as a "memory picture."
JESSICA MITFORD, THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEATH 17-18 (1963); see ELISABETH

KDBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969) (arguing that funeral practices of the
time created unhealthy attitudes about mortality, and revealed an American denial of
death). To Mitford, the only value of embalmed bodies was more profit for funeral
homes. LADERMAN, supra note 9, at 109-10. Laderman addresses further how psychology as a discipline eventually took over grief, as well as the eventual role that
psychology played in the education of funeral directors and morticians following The
American Way ofDeath. Id. at 112-18.
3 See Id. at 88-100 (showing the stereotypes Americans held of funeral di-

rectors and morticians through various film and literary depictions, and explaining
how, up until Mitford, funeral directors could play against the stereotype to their
advantage).
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The New York Times Bestseller became a pervasive part of the American consciousness and inspired a call to reform the industry with regulation of funeral home behavior. 3 2
B.

The FTC's FuneralRule and State Regulatory Boards

Due to growing criticism of the funeral industry3 the FTC
launched an investigation into the funeral industry in 1974. 3 According to the FTC, the investigation was not due to a large number of
complaints, 3 4 but rather was based on more general concerns about a
largely unregulated industry raised in the public arena. 3 5 After nearly
ten years of investigating, the FTC voted to promulgate the Funeral
Rule in 1982,36 which took effect in January 1984.37
The Funeral Rule contains four main substantive sections, covering areas of price disclosure, misrepresentations, required purchase
of funeral goods and services, and services provided without prior approval. 3 8 The first section of the Rule, which became one of the most
significant requirements on funeral homes, aimed to increase transparency by providing consumers the right to get an itemized general price
list upon the customer inquiring into funeral arrangements.39 The se-

32 LADERMAN, supra note 9, at 83-84.
Harrington & Krynski, supra note 17, at 200 (stating that the FTC's investigation of the funeral market was the most extensive until then).
34 LADERMAN, supra note 9, at 133 (citingthe FTC Final Staff Report for
16 C.F.R. pt. 453) (stating that before and after Mitford's The American Way of
Death there had not been a noticeable number of complaints). But see MARK HARRIS,
GRAVE MATTERS: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE MODERN FUNERAL INDUSTRY To A

NATURAL WAY OF BURIAL 9 (2007) (stating that the FTC did consider complaints
that some funeral directors had embalmed bodies without asking the family, some of
who were orthodox Jews, whose faith opposes the embalming process).
3 LADERMAN, supra note 9, at 133 (giving credit for the FTC's sudden vitality to the consumer protection movement in the 1960s led by Ralph Nader); see
also James E. Moliterno, Symposium: The Lawyer as Catalyst of Social Change, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1583 (2009) (quoting Ralph Nader as suggesting that "ample evidence suggested that the FTC was extremely deferential to the corporations it
was supposed to police").
36 Fred S. McChesney, Consumer Ignorance and Consumer Protection
Law: EmpiricalEvidencefrom the FTC FuneralRule, 7 J.L. & POL. 1, 4 (1990).
" 16 C.F.R. § 453 (2015); Harrington & Krynski, supra note 17, at 200.
38 McChesney, supra note 36.
39 There are sixteen specified goods and services which must be on the general price list. 16 C.F.R. § 453.2(a) (2015) ("[I]t is an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a funeral provider to fail to furnish accurate price information disclosing the
cost to the purchaser for each of the specific funeral goods and funeral services ...
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cond section prohibited funeral directors from affirmatively misrepresenting to consumers the state law requirements in six areas: (1) embalming; (2) caskets for direct cremation; (3) outer burial container;
(4) legal and cemetery requirements; (5) preservative and protective
value of goods and services in respect to decomposition; and (6) cash
advance items. 4 0 The third substantive area of the Funeral Rule prevents funeral homes from conditioning desired goods and services on
the purchase of unwanted goods and services. 4 1 This includes tacking
on a charge for an optional good or service in a non-declinable basic
service fee. 4 2 The last substantive section prevents funeral homes from
embalming the deceased without the approval of the family, unless
state law provides it can or there are extenuating circumstances, as laid
out in subsection (a)(3) of the Funeral Rule.
The ultimate goal of the Funeral Rule's requirements was to
increase the transparency in price, so as to both protect consumers and
increase competition. 4 3 The FTC enforces the Funeral Rule by conducting undercover inspections to see if funeral homes are providing
customers with itemized price lists, and are not acting in any way that
violates the Funeral Rule.4 4 Consumers can also file complaints with
."); see Keith Horton, Note, Who's Watching the Cryptkeeper?: The Needfor Regulation and Oversight in the Crematory Industry, 11 ELDER L.J. 425 (2003) ("The
Funeral Rule requires sellers of funeral goods and services to give itemized price lists
to consumers who inquire about purchasing such goods or services and to disclose
which fees are declinable."). The FTC does provide sample price lists for funeral
homes to use to comply with the Funeral Rule. Complying with The Funeral Rule,
FED. TRADE COMM'N 24-29 (Apr. 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0 131 -complying-with-funeral-rule.pdf.
40 16 C.F.R. § 453.3 (2015).
41 16 C.F.R. § 453.4 (2015).
42 Complying with The FuneralRule, FED. TRADE COMM'N
20 (Apr. 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-O131-complyingwith-funeral-rule.pdf.
43 Foos, supra note 12, at 1379 ("The FTC sought to remedy ... the continuously rising price of a funeral and the ability of unethical funeral directors to induce
bereaved consumers into making more expensive purchases.").
44 Truth in Advertising, The FTC'sFuneralRule: Helping ConsumersMake
Informed Decisions During Difficult Times,
FED. TRADE COMM'N,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/truth-advertising/funeral-rule
(last visited Nov. 18, 2015); see Press Release, Undercover Inspections of Funeral
Homes in Nine States and Washington, D.C. Press FuneralHomes to Comply with
16, 2010),
Consumer Protection Law, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Mar.
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/03/undercover-inspectionsfuneral-homes-nine-states-washington-dc (setting forth the penalty for serious violations as a three-year offender's program, with the alternative being a lawsuit potentially resulting in $16,000 per violation).
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the FTC against funeral homes for behavior that they find violative of
the Funeral Rule.4 5
The FTC's attempt at managing funeral director behavior with
the Funeral Rule seemed like a victory for consumers at the time. However, the FTC failed to address the state funeral regulations that could
impede the goals of the Funeral Rule. 4 6 This Note is not suggesting
that the Funeral Rule or the federal government should have usurped
the power from the states to regulate funeral homes across the country.
Rather, this point simply illustrates what other commentators have expressed-that there is a gap between what the Funeral Rule intended
to accomplish, and what state regulatory boards are able to accomplish
through regulations. 4 7 It is this relationship that has led us into the modem funeral home landscape, in which state regulatory boards have implemented new regulations that protect industry interests over consumer interests, and where criticism of the funeral industry has
resurfaced.
III.

JUSTIFYING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSES AND THE WHITE HOUSE
REPORT

A.

GeneralPrinciplesofLicensing Regulations

A general maxim of free market economics is that regulations

45 After receiving a complaint, the FTC then uploads them to the Consumer
Sentinel Network, which is an investigative tool used by both civil and criminal law
enforcement agencies. Complying with The FuneralRule, supra note 42, at 23.
46

FED. TRADE COMM'N, FUNERAL INDUSTRY PRACTICES: FINAL STAFF
REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND PROPOSED TRADE REGULATION

RULE 207 (1978) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 453) (stating that states were left "the task
of correcting features of their regulations that impose unnecessary costs and restrict
consumer choice").
47 See Daniel Sutter, E-commerce Symposium - May 24, 2006: Casket Sales
Restrictions and the Funeral Market, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 219, 221-22 (2007);
Foos, supranote 12; Judith A Chevalier, State Casket Sales Restrictions: A pointless
Undertaking?, 51 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (2008); Fred S. McChesney, supra note 36.
Studies in demand inducement show that the state regulations (which are pro-industry) trump the goals of the Funeral Rule (which was put into place to protect consumers). See infra Part II.B. All that Jessica Mitford wanted was more regulation to
protect consumers, which arguably would help in theory, but the relationship between the two sources of regulations is the ones hurting consumers with continued
high prices and demand inducement.

RegulatingDeath

2017]

353

are only justified in the case of a market failure. 4 8 The essential premise of a free economy is that a competitive market will provide "the
most effective means of promoting economic progress, economic justice and the general welfare." 4 9 However, a free market economy does
not always work.so It is when the economy creates market failures that
regulations are justified.s1 Problems arise when regulations are put in
place absent a market failure, and regulations originally put into place
to address perceived or actual problems prove unnecessary and unworkable in execution. 5 2 A less intrinsic problem, though just as salient, involves who is implementing the regulations, and with whose interests in mind.5 3 As previously stated, this has become one of the main
criticisms of state funeral boards.5 4
This general economic maxim proves true for regulation
through occupational licenses. The existence of occupational licensing
55
schemes, as well as critics of their proliferation, are not new. Occupational licensing was an initial way for some organizations to gain

48 Peter Hettich, Mere Refinement of the State Action Doctrine Will Not
Work, 5 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 105, 106 (2006); Bernard H. Siegan & John Kenneth Galbraith, IndustrialRegulation, Gov., REGULATION, AND THE ECON. 1, 1 (Bernard H. Siegan ed., 1980) ("Economic regulation should remain or be imposed only
when strong or compelling justification for it exists. Under this standard, a relatively
small portion of regulatory controls would survive.").
49 JOEL B. DIRLAM & ALFRED E. KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND

ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY 17 (1954) (addressing the notion that competition
is not necessarily always more efficient, it does not change the fact that the drafters
of the Sherman Act realized that punishing unfair anticompetitive tactics would allow consumers to 9rder industries in a way that benefitted the general welfare).
so Siegan & Galbraith, supra note 48.
51 Id.

52 Hendrick

Houthakker,

Economic Aspects of Deregulation, in
DEREGULATING AMERICAN INDUSTRY 1,, 22 (Donald L. Martin & Warren F.
Schwartz eds., 1977); see Siegan & Galbraith, supra note 48, at 8 (making the distinction between wise and unwise regulations, and how wise, calculated regulatory
schemes can be beneficial to the public).
5 Alan Stone, Economic Regulation, the Free Market, and Public Ownership, in ECONOMIC REGULATORY POLICIES 187, 188 (James E. Anderson ed., 1976)
("Even when they are competent, many regulators are more sympathetic to industries
they are supposed to regulate than they are to their purported mission.").
54 See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
5 See Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of OccupationalLicensing, 44 U. CHI.
L. REv. 6 (1976). Gellhorn delves into American history and explains how certain
occupations became "learned" professions and how the proliferation of pseudo professions have reduced competition and economic mobility.
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integrity in the late nineteenth-century.56 The Supreme Court upheld
the states' ability to license such occupations in Dent v. West Virginia.57 The Court in Dent recognized that justifications of health,
safety, and consumer welfare are legitimate reasons for implementing
occupational licenses in some professions. Although it has been more
than a century since this case was decided, the Court's justifications
are just as important in the present-day analysis of occupational licensing and whether the licenses, and the requirements to obtain them, are
justified.5 9
While occupational licenses grew throughout the 1900s, they
have skyrocketed in the past few decades. More and more professions
require licenses, with a recent study showing that nearly thirty percent
of the workforce is required to obtain a license in order to work.o With
this increase, the requirements that one must meet to obtain a license
has garnered increased attention.61 Typically, these requirements come
in the form of length of education, college degrees, apprenticeships,
examinations, and hefty fees. 6 2 Since those already in the industry benefit from keeping new entrants out, the industry incumbents will more
than likely make "successive demands for making entry costs
56

MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING
QUALITY OR
RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 18 (2006).

" 129 U.S. 114 (1889). The Court in Dent addressed the validity of a regulation that required those wanting to practice medicine to obtain a certificate from
West Virginia's State Board of Health that they graduated from medical school, or
prove to the Board that they are qualified to practice medicine. Id. at 124-25.
5 Id. at 122-23 ("Due consideration, therefore, for the protection of society
may well induce the State to exclude from practice those who have not such a license,
or who are found upon examination not to be fully qualified."); Simon Rottenberg,
The Economics of OccupationalLicensing, in ASPECTS OF LABOR ECONOMICS 3, 4
(Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research ed., 1962) ("From
the earliest times, licensing statutes and ordinances have been adopted by legislatures
on the alleged ground of defense of public health, safety, and morals.").
59 The importance to this Note's present analysis of occupational licensing
requirements will be explained in the subsequent discussion of the White House's
report on the current state of occupational licensing.
60 Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 5; see Timmins & Mills, supra
note 5.
61 For some general examples, see John Hood, Does OccupationalLicensing Protect Consumers?, THEFREEMAN (Nov. 1, 1992), http://fee.org/freeman/doesoccupational-licensing-protect-consumers/. At one point, the time it took to become
a master plumber in the state of Illinois was longer than it took to become of Fellow
of American College of Surgeons. Id. The education requirements for cosmetologists
can range to thousands of hours of training, when arguably they could be taught on
the job. Id. As for application fees, the price to become a licensed optician can be as
high $850. Timmins & Mills, supra note 5.
62 Hood, supra note 61; Timmins & Mills, supra note
5.
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higher." 63
The growing concern over the proliferation of occupational licensing has led federal and state legislatures pushing back, with some
being successful and others not.64 Within the past year, the Supreme
Court addressed an antitrust claim regarding a state regulatory board
in North Carolina, which will likely have implications down the line
for state board liability for anti-competitive behavior. 65 Further, The
White House addressed the issue of occupational licensing in many
industries, 66 and included nearly fifteen million dollars in its budget to
investigate issues of occupational licensing across the country.67
B.

Consumer Welfare and the White House Report

The White House investigated occupational licensing schemes
and issued a report in July 2015 on its findings. 68 One of the main reasons for this investigation stemmed from the fact that licenses restrict
competition and harm consumer welfare. In its seventy-six page report
on the state of occupational licensing, the White House described the
growth in licensing over the past few decades, and the negative impact
it can have on the economy and on specific groups of people. 6 9 Specif-

63 Rottenberg, supra note

58, at 11.

64 Then-Indiana Governor Mike Pence tried unsuccessfully to get over a

dozen occupations deregulated in 2013. Jenni Bergal, A License to BraidHair? Critics Say State Licensing Rules Have Gone Too Far, STATELINE (Jan. 30, 2015),
2

http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/ 015/1/30/a-license-to-braid-hair-critics-say-state-licensing-rules-have-gone-too-far. The Michigan legislature successfully deregulated eight occupations in 2014, with representative Tim Kelly saying "you don't need some silly regulation keeping someone from
earning a living." Id.
65
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). The
Court addressed the N.C. Dental Board's attempt to prevent non-licensed dentists
from offering teeth whitening. Id. at 1104. The Court ruled that when a state board
consisted of a majority of industry participants, the board had to be properly supervised, which it was not, in order to claim state-action antitrust immunity. Id.
66

67
68

White House Licensing Report, supra note 7.

Timmins & Mills, supra note 5.

White House Licensing Report, supra note 7.

Id. at 28-39. Specifically, The White House discusses the impact on those
with criminal records, veterans, military spouses, entrepreneurs, and low-wage workers. Id. For one example, if an industry requires higher education or expensive registration and exam fees, lower-income workers are more likely to not be able to enter
the market. Id at 12. This would essentially be shifting the resources to higher income individuals that can afford to jump through the hoops the regulatory board has
set up. Id
69
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ically, the report mentions that creating barriers to entry restricts competition and drives up consumer prices. 7 0 The report goes further in
explaining that occupational licensing requirements not ony affect
consumers, but also those barred entry and the industry itself.
In an effort to help restore competition to industries and lower
prices for consumers, the report lays out the considerations that need
to be weighed when implementing licensing requirements. The White
House report states that these considerations have not been properly
favored, leading in part to the current over-proliferation of occupational licenses. Two pertinent considerations include ensuring that
the license is closely targeted to public health and safety, and is not
overly broad or burdensome; and a consideration of the costs and benefits of the license.7 3 Part IV will further focus on these practices the
report suggests.
This Note is not suggesting that The White House report in any
way suggests or implies that the licensing of funeral directors should
be completely deregulated. However, there is the interesting case of
Colorado, which is the only state where there is no licensing scheme,
and you only need work at a funeral home in order to be a funeral director.74 What this Note does suggest is that The White House's recent
report breaks down the occupational licensing analysis beyond a simple, binary acceptance-rejection system, and into a more comprehensive, tailored framework. This framework will, and should, give more
focus to the requirements of such licenses, and the costs that variations
in those requirements can have on consumers and those entering the
market.
Moreover, proposed solutions may have a greater likelihood of
effectuating change if we break the analysis down further than just a
70

Id. at 12.

7The wages of those not allowed entry into certain industries will go down

since they will likely have to take lower-paying jobs. Id. By creating carriers to entry,
the industry may even be hampering innovation in its own industry. Id.
72
Id. at 41.
" Id. at 42.
74
State Laws and Regulations, Co. FUNERAL DIRECTORS Ass'N,
http://www.cofda.org/laws (last visited Jan 1, 2015). The Colorado legislature decided that given the lack of consumer complaints, which has remained low even after
licensing was deregulated, and the cumbersome regulatory system, the best course
of action was to deregulate the licensing system. Id. Given that the justifications for
licensing are health, safety, and consumer welfare, the system that Colorado has established seems to be working since: consumer complaints are low; more individuals
can easily enter the market; and the State is no longer burdened to the regulatory
system. That is not to suggest that a solution as seemingly extreme as Colorado's is
the right one for all states.
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mere discussion of whether they should exist or not in a particular industry.75
IV. FUNERAL LICENSING AND THE (NOT-SO-JUSTIFIED) MODERN
JUSTIFICATIONS

A.

Challengingthe Regulations: A Shift in Opinion andLaw

Consumers have begun to notice the deleterious effects that funeral board regulations, enacted for the stated purpose of consumer
protection, have had on them. 76 For example, the funeral board in Montana has received condemnation from consumers as proposed and enacted legislation has had the effect of insulating the funeral industry

7 Some commentators do suggest that the existence of occupational licensing schemes for certain industries is unwarranted, and put solely in place to protect
already existing business from future competition. Harfoush, supra note 6, at 136
("Though sometimes licenses are created to ensure the health and safety of the general public, often they are created to protect already established businesses from facing new competition.") (footnote omitted). What has really led many commentators
to raise their eyebrows is that regulatory boards are placing stringent requirements
on seemingly mundane jobs. Louisiana is the only state in the country that requires
retail florists to have a license, for which you must pass a fifty-dollar exam issued by
the Louisiana Horticulture Commission. Morris Kleiner, Why License a Florist?,
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/opinion/why-license-a-florist.html?_r-0; see Education Requirements, LA. STATE FLORIST'S
(last visited
Ass'N, http://www.1sfaflorists.com/education/floristryexamdates.html
Dec. 31, 2015). While all states require that manicurists obtain licenses, some go so
far as to require that the applicant be proficient in English in order to obtain a license.
Timothy Taylor, OccupationalLicensing and Its Discontents, THE CONVERSABLE
EcONOMIST (Aug. 5, 2015), http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2015/08/occupational-licensing-and-its.html. It is illegal in Arkansas to braid hair without a cosmetology degree, which requires passing state exams and attending cosmetology
school where they do not even teach hair braiding. Jenni Bergal, A License to Braid
Hair? Critics Say State Licensing Rules Have Gone Too Far, STATELINE (Jan. 30,
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/state2015),
line/2015/1/30/a-license-to-braid-hair-critics-say-state-licensing-rules-have-gonetoo-far. The argument is that these jobs are unrelated to concerns of health, safety,
and consumer welfare-the historical justifications for licensing arrangements. Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion A Legitimate State Interest? Four Recent
Cases Test the Boundaries, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023, 1028 (2006).
76 Alain Sherter, In death, a final chance to get gouged, CBS NEWS,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/in-death-a-final-chance-to-get-gouged/ (last updated
Oct. 20, 2015) (stating that consumers are dissatisfied by how the prices for funerals
are exorbitantly high and how inconsistent'prices amongst the funeral homes in a
confined area often frustrates the grieving process).
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from competition, keeping funeral prices at high levels.7 7
The court system has also doubted the justifications being
brought forward for funeral home occupational licensing. Although the
specific issues in some of the cases are beyond the scope of this Note,
the arguments made and illuminated in the opinions all resonate the
idea that funeral industry regulations often work against consumers in
favor of industry interests. For example, in Heffner v. Murphy,7 8 the
Middle District of Pennsylvania heard a challenge to Pennsylvania's
Funeral Directing Law, which restricted who could operate a funeral
home. 7 9 The law narrowed the avenues with which out-of-state firms
could enter the Pennsylvania marketplace, essentially insulating the local funeral homes from the threat of competition.8 The plaintiffs argued at trial that the motivations behind the Funeral Directing Law
were anti-competitive in nature because established funeral directors
grew wary of the stark increase in competition over a period of years.8 1
The court eventually found the law to be unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause, and spent a portion of the opinion recognizing the
plaintiffs' argument that the restrictions on entry into the funeral industry were anti-competitive and worked against consumer interests.
Two separate challenges to nearly identical statutes regarding
n Montana FuneralDirectors Try to Shut Down Competition, FUNERAL
ALLIANCE
(Jan.
30,
2007),
https://www.funerals.org/newsandblogsmenu/blogdailydirge/96-montana-funeral-directors-try-to-shut-down-competition (regarding proposed legislation, which never made it out of committee thanks to
consumer opposition, that would have effectively given funeral homes a legal right
to the custody of a deceased's remains since it would have made it illegal for families
to take care of arrangements themselves at their homes); Montana Running Amok.
. Again, FUNERAL CONS. ALLIANCE, https://www.funerals.org/legislative-watchblog/2802-montana2013 (last updated July 24, 2013) (regarding proposed legislation
that would have made it illegal for crematory operators to do typically routine, mundane procedures, such as removing pacemakers, which would have arguably driven
out competition from low-cost crematoriums); Montana: The Divine Right of Undertakers II, FUNERAL CONS. ALLIANCE (June 20, 2012), https://www.funerals.org/newsandblogsmenu/blogdailydirge/2433-montanaspoja2Ol2 (pointing the
inconsistencies of the Montana Funeral Board's legal arguments for the validity of
regulations with prior statements stating just the opposite). However, at least one
commentator has suggested that consumers want more regulations in certain areas of
the funeral industry due to a perceived lack of oversight. Horton, supra note 39, at
437-38 (pointing out the instances in how the very unregulated crematory business
has led to accusations of theft, returning less remains than were actually removed,
and harvesting body parts).
78 866 F. Supp. 2d 358 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
79 Id. at 383.
8o Id.
" Id. at 371.
.
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licensing regulations resulted in a split between the Tenth and the Sixth
Circuit. In both cases, the circuit courts of appeal addressed funerallicensing regulations that required one to be a licensed funeral director
in order to sell caskets.83 In the Sixth Circuit decision of Craigmiles v.
Giles,84 the court heard a challenge to a Tennessee law restricting casket sales by a local Reverend who was fed up with the expensive prices
charged to members of his congregation, and began to make and sell
cost-effective caskets.ss The court subjected the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clause claims to rational basis review, and found that
the state could not justify even a legitimate interest in the regulation
and held that the regulation was "designed only for the economic protection of funeral home operators." 86 This decision recognized that licensing schemes that only provide a benefit to already existing and
established industry businesses, and hurt consumers in their pocketbooks, are invalid regulations. 87
Less than five years after the Sixth Circuit's decision in Craigmiles, the Tenth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in Powers v.
Harris. 8 The Oklahoma regulation at issue in Powers was similar to
the regulation at issue in Craigmiles89 in that both required someone to
be a licensed funeral director to sell caskets. The regulatory board argued that although the regulation was not perfect, it was crafted well
enough to promote the state interest of protecting a vulnerable group,
These are not the only two courts to have weighed in on this. See St.
Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013); Casket Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi, 124 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D. Miss. 2000). The FTC has also addressed similar
regulations. In the Matter of Missouri Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu061-0026,
No.
File
ments/cases/2008/06/080624msbefddo.pdf.
83 Harfoush, supra note 6, at 141-44,
84 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002).
85 Harfoush, supra note 6, at 141.
86 Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 200-29 (6th Cir. 2002). The State tried
to argue the usual state interest of promoting health, safety, and consumer protection.
Id. at 225. The court disagreed and noted that the only difference in a casket sold by
a retailer and a casket sold by a funeral home was that the latter was often marked up
225-600%. Id. at 224.
87 Id. at 229; Harfoush, supra note 6, at 144 ("In essence, these regulations
are state sanctioned cartels, which impose barriers to entry and keep prices artificially
high.").
8 Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1209-27 (10th Cir. 2004).
89 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 59. §396.2 (West 2010). The Oklahoma regulation
only applied to those trying to sell caskets to the families that had experienced a
death, and not pre-arranged funerals. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1211. Also, the Oklahoma
statute only applied intrastate, allowing non-funeral directors to sell caskets out-ofstate. Id.

-
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and should therefore pass rational basis review. The Tenth Circuit
agreed and reasoned that court intervention into every reulation that
legislatures got wrong would paralyze state governments. The Tenth
Circuit's decision in Powers has received negative commentary,
mainly fear that the decision incentivizes and allows industries other
than the funeral industry to lobby government and create "insurmountable barriers to competition." 9 1
Recently, legal scholars have also become interested in analyzing the relationship between the existence of regulations, what they
require, and how effective or ineffective they are at promoting the interests of consumers.92 Economists David Harrington and Kathy Krynski conducted a polarizing study that looked at the relationship between multiple regulations9 3 and possible demand inducement. The
empirical study found that in the states that require funeral directors to
also be embalmers, cremation rates were reduced by roughly sixteen
percent, and expenditures on funerals were 2.6% higher. 5 These results suggest that funeral directors in those states induce consumers to
choose the more expensive option. 9 6 The study also frames its conclusions in the context of the relationship between regulatory boards and
the goals of the Funeral Rule.9 7
Harrington and Krynski's research influenced a study by David
Foos, who took the analysis one step further and specifically made recommendations as to how states could create better regulatory schemes
that would protect consumer interests. 9 8 The study specifically addressed regulations referred to as "Ready-to-Embalm" statutes, which
require, in some variation, that all funeral homes have embalming facilities and that all funeral directors also be embalmers. 9 9 The study
reached the same conclusions as Harrington and Kryinski, that state

90

Id. at 1218.
91 Harfoush, supra note 6, at 148. But cf, Chevalier, supra note 47.
92 See Stephen W. Kopp & Elyria Kemp, The Death Care Industry: A Review ofRegulatory and ConsumerIssues, 41 J. CONS. AFFS. 150, 150-68 (2007).
The regulations that the study used as variables included licensing
schemes that require all funeral directors to be embalmers, prohibitions on operating
mortuaries in cemeteries, and requirements that crematories be located in cemeteries.
Harrington & Krynski, supra note 17, at 207-10.
94 Id. at 200-01 (hypothesizing that in more regulated states, funeral directors will more likely push ground burials onto consumers as opposed to cremations).
95 Id. at 217, 222.
96 Id. at
222.
97 Id.; see supra Part II.B.
9 Foos, supra note 12.
99
1d. at 1388.
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regulations play an important role in determining the amount of demand inducement. 00 Foos concludes that the historical justifications
for Ready-to-Embalm regulations are no longer viable considerations,
and instead suggests the adoption of hybrid regulations that at the very
least would only require a funeral home to have access to an embalming room.101 He also suggests that the twenty-seven states 1 02 that require all funeral directors to be trained to embalm should bifurcate their
licensing regulations and instead offer a choice of a dual licensing
structure to those wanting to enter the industry.' 0 3 Creating a dual licensing structure would benefit consumers because it would allow funeral homes and those working in them to more adequately offer and
encourage options that the current industry landscape is trending toward.104 This Note will address in the following section how the White
House's framework applies to Foos' suggestion of a bifurcation of
many state-licensing schemes.' 05 However, current literature on occupational licensing, and the White House's recent report identifying a
viable framework for licensing, reveal that the problem may cut deeper
than what a dual licensing system can heal. By looking at the effects
of occupational licensing in regulatory schemes, and the findings in the
White House report, it is evident that the educational requirements of
funeral licensing schemes need also be addressed.
B.

Dual Licensing

One common type of restrictive type of occupational license in
100 id. at 1405; Harrington & Krynski, supra note 17, at 223.

101 Foos, supra note 12, at 1414. Foos also looks to other states that follow

a form of a hybrid model, such as Indiana, which allows for owners of multiple funeral homes to only have an embalming room in one location. Id.
102 These states include: Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Id. at 1388 n.108, 111; Licensing Boards and Requirements, NAT'L
FUNERAL DIRS. Assoc., http://nfda.org/licensing-boards-and-requirements.html
(last visited Dec. 28, 2015).
103 Foos, supra note 12, at 1412-13.
104 See supra Part IV.A. The current landscape being a trend toward alternatives to ground burials that excessive regulations encourage funeral directors to
induce in their customers.
105 Rather, Foos' argument against a single licensing system for both funeral
directors and embalmers is further evidence of a stacked system of regulations that
prevent the Funeral Rule from having its desired effect, and shows how state regulatory boards are protecting the interests of the funeral industry.
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the funeral industry requires funeral directors to also be licensed embalmers. For instance, the District of Columbia does not separate the
two jobs and requires funeral directors to be able to practice both funeral directing and embalming.' 06 The D.C. Municipal Regulations do
not address embalming at all, and only lays out the requirements for
becoming a "Funeral Director," which involves going to mortuar
school and having to embalm twenty-five bodies to obtain a license.
The White House Report's considerations for analysis suggest
that states should bifurcate licenses such as D.C.'s and allow applicant
the choice to be either or both. The first suggestion in the White House
report is to make sure the substantive requirements of licensing are
closely tied to public health and safety. 0 8 This weighs in favor of separating the licenses for funeral directors and embalmers. Historically,
all funeral directors were embalmers and so it was necessary to license
them as one, but the context of the industry has changed. 0 Arguably,
the separation of funeral director and embalmer as professions, and the
authority each has within the funeral business, has drastically decreased the threat to public health and safety .for funeral directors.
Take, for example, the Tennessee statute defining a funeral director."10
The responsibility that has the closest reach to public health and safety
concerns would be the allowance to prepare dead bodies other than
embalming.II' The rest of the definition of a funeral director includes
making arrangements with families, provisioning a site of disposition,
and holding oneself out as a funeral director.112 While preparing dead
bodies other than embalming may raise a "mild" concern, to use language from the White House report,113 it is a large deviation to the
health and safety concerns that historically justified the implementation of the licenses, which were principally addressing the embalming
process. 1 4 In fact, the World Health Organization has stated that it is
an inaccurate conception that handling corpses poses health risks.' '5
1o6

107

D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 17, § 3002 (LexisNexis 2017).

See id. at § 3099.1.

108 White House Licensing Report, supra note 7, at 42.

See supra Part IV.A.
110 TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-101(6) (West 2015).
109

...See

id. § 62-5-101(6)(A)(1).

See id. § 62-5-101(6)(A)(2)-(5).
113 White House Licensing Report, supra
note 7, at 42.
114 See supra Part II.A; Foos, supra note
12, at 1387-88.
115
Water
Sanitation
Health,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
http://www.who.int/watersanitationhealth/emergencies/qa/emergenciesqa8/en/
112

(last visited Mar. 10, 2016); see Dead Bodies and Disease: the "Danger" that
Doesn't Exist, FUNERAL CONS. ALLIANCE, https://funerals.org/?consumers=dead-

bodies-disease-danger-doesnt-exist (last visited Mar. 18, 2016) (stating that the
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Also, the modem trends of the twenty-first-century funeral industry illuminate the future role that funeral directors will play in the
business. Most people no longer want to be embalmed and interned,
and are now considering alternatives to ground burial.1 16 One of the
17
biggest trends in the funeral industry has been toward cremation.' In
1980, the cremation rate in America was 9.7%,118 while the rate in
2013 was 45.4%.119 There are many reasons why cremation has become such a popular alternative, including cost, 12 0 environmental
1 22
and
awareness, 1 2 1 changes in religious ~erspectives on cremation,
Also, cremations allow families
the decline of the nuclear family.
flexibility in choosing exactly what type of service they want.124 Another eco-friendly alternative receiving increasing interest is green burials, broadly defined as burials meant to have a small, if infinitesimal,
ecological impact. 12 5 In 2015, 64% of adults over forty said they would

World Health Organization, the Center for Disease Control, and the Pan-American
Health Organization have all published data supporting the proposition that dead
bodies pose no health risk, even when unembalmed).
Horton, supra note 39, at Part IV.A.
117 Horton, supra note 39, at 429.
118 Karen Parker, Cremation Trends: Are the Numbers of Cremations Increasing?, NEPTUNE SOC'Y (May 4, 2013), http://www.neptunesociety.com/aboutcremation/cremation-trends.
"9 Statistics, NAT'L FUNERAL DIRS. Assoc., http://nfda.org/about-funeralservice-/trends-and-statistics.html#cremationburial (last updated Jan. 11, 2017).
120 Tyler Mathisen, Cremation is the hottest trend in the funeral industry,
NBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/cremation-hottesttrend-funeral-industry-lB8068228 (cremations cost a third of what a burial costs);
Horton, sU ra note 39, at 430.
12PIEarth-Friendly Cremations, AGREENERFUNERAL.ORG,

http://agreen-

erfuneral.org/greener-funerals/earth-friendly-cremations/
(last visited Nov. 18,
2015) (explaining that cremations use far less resources than other forms of disposition, and future developments in more advanced filtration systems will reduce the
amount of mercury that is emitted in the process).
122 Mathisen, supra note 120 (Until 1963 the Catholic Church outlawed cremation, but now bishops can even permit a funeral mass with the cremated remains
present).

Mathisen, supra note

120 ("As more Americans live far from
hometowns and parents, and as family burial plots have waned in popularity and
accessibility, millions have turned to cremation as a practical and cost-effective way
to care for a loved one's remains.").
124 Parker, supra note 118 (a family could choose a direct cremation with
no service, a full service followed by cremation, or a service when they spread the
ashes).
125 Robert Schroeder, Why More Americans are considering 'green'funerals, MARKETWATCH.COM (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/why123
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be interested in green funerals, as compared to 43% in 2010.126 As interest in green alternatives to funerals has risen, the availability of
green cemeteries has also risen over the past decade. 12 7 The funeral
process can also be green by using locally grown flowers, organic food,
and recycled paper products.128 These growing alternatives, which will
continue to grow as demand inducement decreases, 12 9 do not present
the health and safety concerns that embalming does. As we continue
through the twenty-first-century, regulatory boards will see an evolving profession in funeral directing that does not threaten health and
safety the way it did one hundred or even fifty years ago. The regulatory boards would be stunting innovation and progression by not
reevaluating the occupational licenses in place, and would essentially
allow the regulation to become more harmful to consumers over time.
C.

EducationalRequirements

Another restrictive element in occupational licensing schemes
is the educational requirements needed to obtain a license. The White
House Report suggests that states should consider the requirement of
particularized education for funeral directors, and how it relates to public health and safety. Although many states still have not adopted a
more-americans-are-considering-green-funerals-2015-10-29. Compared to the ecological impact of traditional burial and cremation, green burials are the most environmental friendly alternative. Shannon Palus, How to Be Eco-Friendly When You're
Dead, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/10/how-to-be-eco-friendly-when-youre-dead/382120/. Traditional burials leave a million pounds of wood, concrete, and steel in the ground every year,
while one cremation requires "about two SUV tanks worth of fuel." Id.
12 FAMIC Study, New Study Shows Americans Recognize the Role of Memorialization in Healthy Healing Following the Death of a Loved One, FUNERAL
AND MEMORIAL INFO. COUNCIL, http://www.famic.org/index.php/famic-study (last
visited Nov. 18, 2015).
127 Green Cemeteries, AGREENERFUNERAL.ORG, http://www.agreenerfuneral.org/ greener-cemeteries/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2017) (The number of green cemeteries in the U.S. has gone from a handful in the 1990s to 150 in 2014). The number
of providers, including both cemeteries and funeral homes, that the Green Burial
Council has certified is currently 340. Find a Provider, GREEN BURIAL COUNCIL,
http://greenburialcouncil.org/find-a-provider/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). This number pales in comparison to the 20,915 funeral homes operating in the U.S. in 2015.
General Funeral Service Facts, NAT'L FUNERAL DIRS. Assoc. (July 30, 2015),
http://nfda.org/about-funeral-service-/trends-and-statistics.html.
128 Trends
in Funeral Service, NAT'L FUNERAL DIRS. Assoc.,
http://nfda.org/media-center/trends-in-funeral-service.html (last visited Nov. 18,
2015).
129 See supra notes and text accompanying
notes 92-96.
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dual licensing system,130 some states that have require that funeral directors be educated at a school accredited by the American Board of
Funeral Service Education. For example, Tennessee changed itslicensing system in 2010 and required that one has to attend such a school in
order to be a licensed funeral director. 13 1 This is not necessarily damning to the regulatory scheme, however, in considering the relationship
to health and safety, state boards should look to alternatives, including
and especially direct regulatory establishments, including regular inspection of funeral homes.1 3 2 Funeral homes are already subject to independent inspections by state funeral boards and the Occupational
Safety & Health Administration. Moreover, forty states currently have
continuing education requirements, 133 which ensure that funeral directors know how to perform their jobs in line with public health and
safety concerns. Furthermore, even though it may address consumer
welfare more than public health and safety, funeral directors will still
have to comply with the Funeral Rule and be subject to inspections
from the FTC. 34 This argument is not to suggest that the current state
of funeral home inspections is enough to warrant no required education, but is rather to illustrate that the industry is no stranger to inspection, and that there are multiple ways in which state regulatory boards
can supplement stringent educational requirements with a system of
inspection that would have the same effect on public health and safety.
State boards should also evaluate the requirement of particularized education, not just through the lens of public health and safety,
but also market entry costs. Take for example the already-discussed.
requirement in Tennessee for individuals to attend a school accredited
by the American Board of Funeral Service Education in order to be
licensed. 13 5 The White House Report stated that such educational requirements can stand high in the wa for lower-income individuals
wanting to become funeral directors. 36 What is more telling of the
Tennessee's law discriminatory .effects on prospective entrants, however, is that there is only one accredited school in Tennessee, located

130 See supra notes and text accompanying notes 105-13.
131 TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-305(b)(6) (West 2016).

132 White House LicensingReport, supra note 7, at 43.
LicensingBoards and Requirements, supra note 101.
134 See Section II.B. Such a type of deregulation would in theory allow for
the Funeral Rule to actually do what it was intended to do, instead of be overshadowed by state regulations that do not have consumer interest in mind. See Harrington
& Krynski, supra note 17; Foos, supra note 12.
1 See supra notes and text accompanying notes 92-96.
136 White House LicensingReport, supra note 7, at 12.
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in Nashville. 1 3 7 Tennessee does have a Reciprocity Statute, which allows for those accredited out of state to practice in Tennessee.138 However, the costs, both monetary and personal, a Tennessean not residing
in Nashville would incur to relocate to Nashville or out-of-state seems
unduly restrictive given the alternatives that are available. 13 9 By altering the requirement for particularized education and allowing those in
Tennessee, and other similar states, alternative ways to acquire the statutorily mandated education, the implications of this bar to entry will
be lowered. And given the lack of public health and safety concerns, it
seems unjustifiable not to do so.
What about the other justification for occupational licensing,
consumer welfare, that we have seen? Many funeral boards state upfront that the regulations they implement, including occupational licensing, are for consumer welfare. "Consumer welfare" evades a precise definition, simply because what threatens the consumer changes
over time. At the turn of the nineteenth-century, when many industries,
including the funeral industry, first obtained occupational licensing,
the threat to consumers dealt with their lack of knowledge of what was
happening in the industries. 14 0 Occupational licenses resulted in regulato~z boards, which resulted in increased transparency for consumers.
As times have changed, a lack of information in the funeral industry no longer seems to affect the meaning of "consumer welfare."
Consumers nowadays seem to be more concerned with the high price
of funerals. 1 4 2 State legislatures should reevaluate if the funeral boards
in their particular state should consist of a majority of industry professionals, 3 when the actions they are taking in the name of "consumer
welfare" have the opposite effect.

137 ABFSE Directory of Programs-Tennessee, ABFSE, http://www.abfse.org/html/dir-tn.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2016) (listing John A. Gupton College
as the only school in Tennessee).
138 TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-311
(West 2016).
39 Other states use some alternatives to attendance at
an ABFSE accredited
school, such as: California, which only requires an associate's degree in any subject;
Kansas, which requires sixty credit hours at a college, twenty of which are defined
by the state board; Kentucky, which only requires a high school education, but also
requires three years of apprenticeship. Licensing Boards and Requirements, supra
note 102.
140 MORRIS A. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR
RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 22 (2006).
141

Id.

See supra Section II.C.
143 See supra notes and text accompanying notes
43-45.
142
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AVENUES FOR CHANGE: CHALLENGING THE OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSES

Consumers of the funeral industry bear the costs of the restrictive nature of occupational licensing schemes. It is therefore in consumers' hands to be the impetus for change in the industry. There are
various methods in which consumers and affected parties can challenge these regulations legally. The regulations can be challenged constitutionally, such as the equal protection and due process challenges
previously discussed. 144 However, plaintiffs would likely have an uphill battle in seeking dual-licensing schemes and relaxed educational
requirements. Under a rational basis review, a regulatory board would
only need to show a rational relationship between the regulation and a
legitimate state interest in the regulation. 145 Successful challenges under rational basis review are rare, but it does remain a possible avenue
into the courtroom. A worthier avenue may be to challenge the occupational licenses under antitrust theories, especially with a recent Supreme Court antitrust decision that revisited state regulatory board immunity. 146 Regardless of how successful these suits may be against
funeral boards, the potential losing immunity creates the opportunity
for affected parties to advocate for consumer-friendly changes that will
allow the boards to may maintain their immunity.
A. A Lack ofAntitrust Immunity: North CarolinaState Board ofDental Examiners v. FTC
Parties affected by the anti-competitive occupational licensing
may take their claims to court under antitrust theories. The Supreme
Court recently decided North CarolinaState Board ofDental Examiners v. FTC 14 which broadened the potential liability under the Sherman Actl14' for state regulatory boards. The Court looked at the twopart Midcal test in determining whether the state regulatory board in
question could invoke antitrust immunity. 149 In order to invoke im-

See supra Section IV.A (certain occupational licenses being challenged
under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause).
145 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 687-88 (citing Heller v.
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
146 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1104 (2015).
147 Id. at 1104; see discussion, supra note 65, and accompanying text.
148 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (2012).
49
1 N.C. State Bd. ofDental Exam'rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1110.
144
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munity, the board must satisfy two requirements: (1) that "the challenged restraint . . . be one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy," and (2) the implemented policy be supervised
by the State.1 5 0 The Court reasoned that there was practically no difference between a regulatory board made up of market participants and
one made up of private trade associations, and thus immunity could
not be based on "nomenclature alone."'5 ' In order to obtain immunity
for regulatory boards made up of market participants, the State must
adopt clear policies for stomping out anticompetitive regulations.1 5 2
The Supreme Court's decision creates more potential antitrust
liability for all state regulatory boards that are made up of mostly market participants. The implication comes from the fact that the antitrust
problems created by regulatory boards are structural, and not substantive.153 Future courts will not apply North Carolinaand determine immunity based on the substance of the implemented regulations, but will
rather look at whether a state is adequately supervising the decisions
of the boards.1 5 4 As many industry regulatory boards, notyust funeral
boards, are made up of a majority of market participants,' future decisions may find that many state regulatory boards are not immune
from antitrust liability.
The Supreme Court's decision in North Carolinawill allow affected parties to bring antitrust suits against funeral boards because
most of the funeral boards across the country are made up of a majority
of market participants.1 5 6 However, it is unclear how courts will determine "active supervision" of the regulatory boards under North Carolina as it will depend on a case by case basis.1 5 7 However, the current
50

Id. (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)).
1Id.

152

at 1114.

Id.

153 Jarod Bona, My Analysis of the Supreme Court's North
CarolinaState

Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC Decision, THE ANTITRUST ATT'Y BLOG (Mar.
14, 2015), http://www.theantitrustattomey.com/2015/03/14/my-analysis-of-the-supreme-courts-north-carolina-state-board-of-dental-examiners-v-ftc-decision/.
54
1 id.
1 Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels By Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (2014)
("[L]icensing boards are largely dominated by active members of their respective
industries.").
156 Who Enforces the Laws? ALSIRAT.ORG, http://www.alsirat.com/silence/consumers/enforcement.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (stating that only one
state had a majority of consumers on the funeral regulatory board in 2001).
1 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1116-17
(2015).
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makeup of most funeral boards, and the lack of oversight from nonmarket-participant supervisors or legislators, would potentially fail the
second prong of the Midcal immunity test and open the door for antitrust challenges to the occupational licensing schemes. 158
B. RegainingImmunity under North Carolina:
Advocating to the Legislature
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in North Carolina,
state legislatures are in a position to implement new, clear policies to
actively supervise the regulatory boards and satisfy the second prong
of the Midcal requirements. One of the major issues in challenging
state boards directly deals with the fact that state regulatory boards are
the ones implementing the funeral regulations. State funeral boards
like many regulatory boards, are made up of industry professionals.
Take for example North Carolina, whose funeral board is made up nine
people, six of whom are industry professionals and are recommended
to the Governor for appointment by two different trade organizations.160 It is this relationship between trade organizations and state
regulatory boards that allow for industry-friendly, industry-protective
regulations to be stacked up against consumer interests. 1 6 Such regulations have recently garnered the attention of consumers, courts, and
See Patel v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 10209 (Tex. 2015) (laying out the proliferation of occupational licensing and how North
Carolinawill be applied in various contexts); see also FTC Staffguidance on Active
Supervision of State Regulatory Boards Controlled by Market Participants, FED.
Guidance],
Staff
[hereinafter
2015)
14,
(Oct.
COMM'N
TRADE
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance/active supervisionofstateboards.pdf (laying out guiding factors that are relevant
when evaluating whether active supervision exists over regulatory boards controlled
by market participants).
159 Who Enforces the Laws?, supra note 156.
160 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-210.18A (West 2015); see Holly Stevens, Why the
Law Matters-What Every Funeral Consumer Needs to Know, FUNERAL CONS.
http://www.funerals.org/newsandblogsmenu/blogALLIANCE (Jan. 22, 2009),
dailydirge/462-northcarolinafuneralconsumerlaw.
161 Another challenge in advocating to these boards is consumers' relatively
unorganized nature as compared to the industry's interest groups. One element of
this is that consumers of the funeral industry are not in sharp contrast with the industry interests. See Gellhorn,supra note 55, at 16. Though the general public may know
that they will one day be consumers of the funeral industry, the negative effects of
158

occupational licenses do not present such a large problem to warrant getting involved. The economist Walter Gellhorn points out the obvious that a well-knit special interest group will have more success at challenging state regulatory and legislatures than will an "amorphous public" whose members are dispersed. Id. Special
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commentators.162 Because advocating to the market-participant-dominated state boards is somewhat futile for aggrieved parties, advocating
to state legislatures to come into compliance with North Carolinaand
the second prong of the Midcal test seems to be the more realistic avenue.
There are a number of changes to the funeral regulatory boards
that affected parties can advocate for state legislatures to adopt. First,
state legislatures could restructure funeral boards and make the majority of the membership non-market participants. Second, a state could
avoid all antitrust liability by making funeral boards that act only in an
advisory capacity. 1 63 This would still allow funeral boards to oversee
compliance with the regulations, and would also give the power of implementing regulations to the non-market-participant legislature.
Third, the legislature could designate an executive agency to hold hearings and accept recommendations from parties other than those on the
board to assess the substance of the regulation and its proposed justifications. 16 4 These types of changes to the structure of funeral boards
would allow non-market participants to have a more powerful voice in
occupational license regulations, and create a more competitive industry.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The high prices for funerals reflect a system of regulations in
favor of those wanting to keep the market all to themselves.' 65 The
occupational licensing schemes of the funeral industry are an important regulation to those in the industry because they constructively
bar those willing to participate in the trade.1 6 6 The solution seems simple in this case: loosen the regulations in the funeral industry as to allow more competition and benefit consumers. This is not to suggest
that the world needs more funeral homes or directors, as evidenced in
the preceding paragraph. But what the world needs, what the economy
needs, and what consumers need, is more competition. This is easier
said than done since those controlling the competition through regulations are the ones who benefit from a lack thereof-those already in
interest groups representing consumers of the funeral industry have become more
prevalent, but until regulatory boards no longer consist of industry professionals, it
is unlikelK that these groups will have much success appealing directly to the boards.
62 See supra Section IV.A.
163 Staff Guidance, supranote 158.
I64 Id.
65 See
166

supra Section III.
See supra Sections IV and V.
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the industry.' 6 7 However, the White House framework illuminates the
ways in which the occupational licenses of the funeral industry can be
tailored by policymakers to create competition without stripping away
all funeral licensing schemes.1 6 8 This is still easier said than done, but
there is hope in the cause. Given that the Supreme Court has opened
an avenue to challenge these regulations through antitrust litigation,
the cause seems to be alive and well. The only challenge is that it requires that the public become more vested in the funeral industry. Just
as Jessica Mitford illustrated in her life's work, consumers can have
an impact on how the funeral industry operates. And given that we will
all be consumers of this industry one day, we should try to have an
impact.

167 JAMES D. GWARTNEY ET AL., MICROECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC

CHOICE 224 (15th ed. 2008).
168 See supra Section IV.

